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THE CONCEPT OF PRIVACY AND THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT
Nothing is more unnerving to those amid the flak on the front
lines than to receive commands of constitutional force
phrased in unmistakably unclear language.
It falls regularly to the state judges and recurringly to
federal judges to expound with common as well as con-
stitutional sense the skywriting that at times dots just enough
t's to cross the eyes, but trails off on the if 's, and's, and but's.
The loftier the message and the more removed from the
local scene, the more difficult it is for the judges on the
ground to work out the ground rules. If they fail to transpose
the message into earthy language, either because of their own
ineptitude or because the message itself defies transposition,
it continues to plane in the stratosphere with ill effect to itself
as well as to those who are grounded. A rugged constitution,
by definition the law of the land, suffers a loss of vitality when
it must circle in thin air indefinitely .... '
The difficulties of interpreting the fourth amendment 2 have
been compounded by the lack of clear guidance from the Supreme
Court, with a consequent need for lower courts to make up their
own ground rules as they go along, resulting in significant in-
consistency among the opinions.3
Of course, some slippage between the positive law and its
actualization in concrete cases is inevitable. Because of the
"open-ended" nature of language, 4 a rule of law can never be so
confined as to specify every possible contingency, 5 even if such
I R. TRAYNOR, THE DEVILS OF DUE PROCESS IN CRIMINAL DETECTION, DETENTION,
AND TRIAL 10- I1 (23d Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture, delivered before the Ass'n of the
Bar of the City of New York, 1966).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
3 Compare, e.g., Cullins v. Wainwright, 328 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1964) (fourth amend-
ment violated by removing heating grill in apartment above defendant's and lowering
microphone into heating duct within walls of defendant's apartment), with Jones v. United
States, 339 F.2d 419 (5th Cir. 1964) (fourth amendment not violated by removing heating
grill in apartment next to defendant's permitting visual and auditory observation of defen-
dant's apartment). See also cases cited in note 151 infra.
4
SeegenerallyH. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 121-32 (1961).
5 If the state of affairs in which a rule becomes operative is fully specified as to every
possible detail, it is applicable to only that one possible fact situation, and represents a
unique decision for a unique state of affairs. The more common meaning of "rule,"
particularly in the law, refers to a generalized decision, applicable to certain classes or
categories of fact situations. In the latter instance applicability is always problematic to
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precision were considered desirable.6 Thus, discretion and flex-
ibility are a part of the process of determining the law's effect in a
particular fact situation. There is a point, however, where too
much pliabilty in the application of a rule becomes dysfunctional
by fostering inconsistency and uncertainty. 7 This latter type of
problem is especially severe in the area of fourth amendment
interpretation. 8 If fourth amendment law is ever to be more than
unintelligible "skywriting," 9 the problems to which the fourth
amendment is addressed must be viewed from new and better
perspectives. Currently there are no conceptual frameworks for
analyzing search and seizure that are adequate to the task.'0
some extent. See generally J. STONE, LEGAL SYSTEM AND LAWYERS' REASONINGS 201
(1964).
6 A major characteristic of the legal process has always been the tension between formal
and substantive justice, i.e., between the "impartial" application of a rule of law and its
adjustment to fit the wide variety of the individual cases within its purview. Though by no
means resolving this dilemma in favor of rampant discretion, the common law systems
have tended to emphasize adaptation of the law to meet evolving exigencies and attempted
to avoid the "tyranny of generalities." In this sense, a certain flexibility is not only inherent
in the nature of language and of rules, but is also desirable and beneficial.7Addressing this problem specifically with regard to the fourth amendment, one author
has written:
The importance of distilling a rational and understandable body of rules
out of a complex maze of conflicting judicial precedents cannot be over-
estimated. Regrettably, the ways of enforcing the right to privacy are much
too different and even less understood. Too many conflicting decisions, the
product of two hundred years of piecemeal application, have spawned a
conglomeration of principles that defy analysis by the most astute among us.
Through these two hundred years, the problems and demands of society have
undergone radical change, and in typical common law fashion we have
heaped solution upon solution without troubling ourselves with the task of
discovering a basic, understandable theme....
In an atmosphere of uncertainity, apparently no one can be happy, much
less secure.
M. SLOUGH, PRIVACY, FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY 91-92 (1969).
8 "The course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures," Justice
Frankfurter once observed, "has not-to put it mildly-run smooth." There
are many debated and debatable points concerning search and seizure, but
this certainly is not one of them. This field of law, sometimes characterized
as a "quagmire," . . . has not been marked by even and steady growth. The
Supreme Court has acknowledged that many of its decisions cannot be
reconciled, and the same might be said for the decided cases of other courts.
No area of the law has so bedeviled the judiciary, from the Justices of the
Supreme Court down to the magistrate; "reasonable men simply cannot
agree on what is a reasonable search."
LaFave, Search and Seizure: "The Course of True Law ... Has Not... Run Smooth,"
1966 U. ILL. L.F. 255 (footnotes omitted). This observation remains equally true six years
later. See, e.g., LaFave, Warrantless Searches and the Supreme Court: Further Ventures
Into the "Quagmire," 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 9 (1972); Player, Warrantless Searches and
Seizures, 5 GA. L. REV. 269, 292 (1971). Also note Justice Stewart's appraisal in
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 483 (1971):
Of course it would be nonsense to pretend that our decision today reduces
Fourth Amendment law to complete order and harmony. The decisions of
the Court over the years point in differing directions and differ in emphasis.
No trick of logic will make them all perfectly consistent.
9 See text accompanying note I supra.
10 It may well be, as Justice Stewart commented in Coolidge, that there is "no
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The following are suggestions for the construction of such a
theoretical framework. They attempt at a minimum to offer a
common background and frame of reference for defining and
comparing myriad facets of the law. If successful, they furnish a
model for the integration of these many facets. This inquiry begins
with an examination of the proposition that the essence of the
fourth amendment is protection of a right of privacy. The concept
of privacy is then defined and elaborated, both without and within
the constitutional context. These conclusions are further extended
in an exploration of mechanisms for defining the invasions and
protection of fourth amendment privacy.
I. THE RELATION OF PRIVACY TO THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Although the fourth amendment is commonly considered to
create a right of privacy, 1" it does not do so explicitly. Privacy is
nowhere mentioned in the text of the amendment.12 The identi-
fication of privacy with the fourth amendment must be explained
by a two-step process, establishing first the existence of the right
and then its characterization.
A. The Existence of an Affirmative Fourth Amendment Right
The existence of such a right follows logically from the lan-
guage of the amendment, for a constitutional guarantee such as
this may be said to imply two essential elements. The first is the
substantive right which is to be protected. This is the quality of
life or state of affairs which the constitutional guarantee seeks to
promote or defend. The second is the type of act or event which
will operate to negate that affirmative right. At least in terms of
the dichotomous alternatives which characterize legal decisions,
these two elements are mutually exclusive. In any discrete fact
situation there are only two possibilities-either the right is ful-
filled and not invaded, or invaded and not fulfilled. Therefore,
trick of logic" which will make all of the decisions of the Court in this area
perfectly consistent. But it is not a trick of logic which is needed, but rather
some assurance that the cases are being decided in accordance with a
coherent analytical framework.
LaFave, Warrantless Searches and the Supreme Court, supra note 8, at 27.
11 See, e.g., McKay, The Right of Privacy: Emanations and Intimations, 64 MICH. L.
REV. 259, 272-73 (1965).
12 The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the




they must be defined as complementary parts of a unity. The
existence of one equals the nonexistence of the other. Choosing
between them in a given instance is analogous to flipping a coin,
where "heads" is identical to "not-tails," and "tails" is identical to
"not-heads."
In the fourth amendment, the "right . .. to be secure ... against
unreasonable searches and seizures" expresses the guarantee as a
negation, i.e., "searches and seizures" are invasions of the right,
but the substantive right itself is expressed essentially as
"not-searches and seizures."' 13 Searches and seizures are the op-
erative terms; the right to be secure is merely a residual category,
equivalent to "not-tails." But just as "not-tails" must also be
"heads," the prohibition of searches and seizures is also a protec-
tion of something else. This something else has been labeled
privacy, and the accompanying right to receive such protection
which accrues to the citizen-beneficiary is denominated a right of
privacy. 14 Thus the extrapolation of an affirmative sphere of pro-
tection from the terms of the amendment is ineluctable, but in
view of its construction, must be done indirectly.
B. The Characterization of an Affirmative
Fourth Amendment Right
Unlike the existence of some sort of affirmative right to protec-
tion, its characterization in terms of "privacy" is not dictated by
the internal logic of the amendment. It is simply a usage which
has evolved over time and is now firmly entrenched in legal
discourse. "Privacy" is presumably employed for its value as a
descriptive device, indicating something about the attributes per-
13 The defect [in the usual approach to defining the interests protected by the
fourth amendment] is that the right is defined solely by the wrong. Therefore,
there is no need to define the right independently. The reach of the right of
privacy is no longer than the current catalog of specific governmental
wrongs.... The result of that fragmented effort has been to blur the right of
privacy and, in the context of the Fourth Amendment, to dim the right almost
to the point of extinction.
Hufstedler, The Directions and Misdirections of a Constitutional Right of Privacy, 26
RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 546, 549-50 (1971) (28th Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture, deliv-
ered before the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York).
14 The fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seiz-
ures has had a double-edged effect. Its operative function is exclusionary; it
works negatively to keep out the unwelcome agencies of government. It
follows logically, however, that where something is to be kept out, that from
which it is barred deserves recognition in a positive sense. It is for this
reason that the fourth amendment should be looked upon as safeguarding an
affirmative right of privacy.
Note, From Private Places to Personal Privacy: A Post-Katz Study of Fourth Amend-
ment Protection, 43 N.Y.U.L. REV. 968 (1968)(footnotes omitted).
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ceived as belonging within the amendment's sphere of protection.
This usage may be explained in two ways: by tracing its historical
development, and by comparing the scope of the amendment's
protections with a general concept of privacy. These inquiries are
important because they can indicate not only what the courts
mean when they use the word in this context, but also the ways in
which this mode of expression might itself shape their con-
ceptualizations.15
1. The Historical Development of Privacy as the Referent of
Fourth Amendment Protection -The development of the idea and
reality of privacy in society, 16 and of its application to searches
and seizures,' 7 was the product of several closely interrelated
forces. First, as the culture and values of Americans have
changed, so have the types of privacy interests requiring protec-
tion. Advances in technology, and concomitant changes in life
styles, have increased the ways in which these interests may be
violated and produced consequent changes in the legal mecha-
nisms applied in their defense. Finally, the cases in which
searches and seizures have been at issue have varied greatly over
time, both in terms of quantity and in the nature of their factual
content.
For roughly the first hundred years of this country's existence,
its population was basically homogeneous, with a widespread
similarity in nationality, background, habits, and tastes. 18 There
was less need to escape from the observation of others, for the
comparatively high consensus and integration of norms and values
made individual deviance less likely and retreat from the world
less essential.' 9 In a largely rural country, sheer physical distance
between people reduced a person's necessary contacts with
others.20 Many of the strains which did develop were eased by the
15 Hyman Gross, in discussing various uses of the term "privacy," has noted a number
of "situations in which psychological associations on occasions of word-use affect usage.-
Gross, The Concept of Privacy, 42 N.Y.U.L. REV. 34, 39 (1967).
1
6 See generally A. WESTIN, PRIVACY IN WESTERN HISTORY (1967); O'Connor, The
Right to Privacy in Historical Perspective, 53 MASS. L.Q. 101 (1968); Shils, Privacy: Its
Constitution and Vicissitudes, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 281, 288-305 (1966).
17 See generally J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT
(1966); N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (1937); Stengel, The Background of the Fourth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, 3 U. RICHMOND L. REV. 278 and 4
U. RICHMOND L. REV. 60 (1969).
18 
O'Connor, supra note 16, at 103.
19 This follows from viewing privacy as providing an essential release valve for tensions
between personal and social standards of conduct. See Simmel, Privacy, in 12 IN-
TERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 480, 482-83 (D. Sills ed. 1968)
[hereinafter cited as SOCIAL SCIENCES]; Schwartz, The Social Psychology of Privacy, 73
AM. J. OF SOCIOLOGY 741, 744-45 (1968).
2
0
O'Connor, supra note 16, at 103-04.
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continuous expansion of the frontier, which provided an abun-
dance of room for an expanding and slowly diversifying popu-
lation.21
Technology was unsophisticated and communication was large-
ly limited to direct speech or writing. A man's confidences could
be penetrated only by the naked eye or ear, and his property
invaded only by physical entry or appropriation. 22 In this context,
the concrete phraseology of the fourth amendment 23 is not sur-
prising, for it was aimed at a particular class of very palpable
invasions 24 of very tangible possessions. 25 Yet these practical
strictures were grounded in classical liberal ideals of the integrity
of the individual and his property and of limitation of the arbitrary
exercise of power by the government.
2 6
References to the fourth amendment during this era reflected its
diffuse libertarian background as well as its specific roots in colo-
nial history. In 1833, in his highly influential Commentaries on
the Constitution of the United States, Justice Story wrote of the
"rights of personal security, personal liberty, and private proper-
21 Id. at 104-05. See generally F. TURNER, THE FRONTIER IN AMERICAN HISTORY
(1920).
22 See A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 330 (Bodley Head 1970).
" Chief Justice Taft's opinion in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1927), is an
example of a "concrete" reading of the amendment. In that case, the fourth amendment
was held not to prohibit the tapping of telephone wires. By limiting searches and seizures
to their meanings at the time the amendment was adopted, an emphasis on their con-
notations of physical entry and appropriation was assured. Id. at 465. In this view there
must be an "actual entrance into the private quarters of defendant and the taking away of
something tangible." Id. at 464. Even a liberal construction of the amendment "can not
justify enlargement of the language employed beyond the possible practical meaning of
houses, persons, papers, and effects, or so to apply the words 'search and seizure' as to
forbid hearing or sight." Id. at 465.
24 Alone among those constitutional provisions which set standards of fair
conduct for the apprehension and trial of accused persons, the Fourth
Amendment provides us with a rich historical background rooted in Ameri-
can, as well as English, experience: it is the one procedural safeguard in the
constitution that grew directly out of the events which immediately preceded
the revolutionary struggle with England.
J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 17, at 19. The particular invasions of privacy which ultimately
generated the constitutional protection were the hated general warrants or writs of assis-
tance by which officials were given blanket authorizations to search and seize according to
their unfettered discretion. Id. at 30-38; N. LASSON, supra note 17, at 51-78: Stengel,
supra note 17, at 291-98. Concerning the English experience with the writs, see
J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 17, at 20-30; Stengel, supra note 17, at 278-91.
2 The enumeration of "persons, houses, papers and effects," even if not taken literally
to exhaust the objects of the amendment's protection (see note 23 supra), could never-
theless be read to refer to a fairly limited class of protected areas. Such has not been the
case. In the words of Justice Stewart, "the Court has been far from niggardly in construing
the physical scope of Fourth Amendment protection." Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139,
143 (1962). By 1967, even the idea of objectively fixed areas of protection was abandoned.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-53 (1967).But seepart I IA I infra.
26 A. WESTIN, supra note 22, at 330.
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ty," guaranteed by the fourth amendment. 27 This phrase found its
way into judicial opinions, 28 and seems to have been the seminal
statement of abstract fourth amendment protections. In 1868
Judge Cooley's Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations re-
ferred to
that maxim of the common law which secures to the citizen
immunity in his home against the prying eyes of the govern-
ment, and protection in person, property, and papers even
against the process of the law, except in a few specified cases.
The maxim that "every man's house is his castle" is made a
part of our constitutional law in the clause prohibiting unrea-
sonable searches and seizures .... 29
At a later point, he refers in passing to invasions of "one's
privacy."
3 0
In 1886 the Supreme Court decided its first important fourth
amendment case, Boyd v. United States?' In his much quoted
opinion, Justice Bradley gave the amendment a very liberal in-
terpretation. 32 Though much of his analysis was questionable, the
2 7 
J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1895, at
748 (1st ed. 1833).28See, e.g., In re Meador, 16 F. Cas. 1294, 1298 (No. 9375) (C.C.M.D. Ga. 1869).29 
T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON
THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 299-300 (1st ed.
1868), (footnote omitted).
30 Id. at 305.
31 116 U.S. 616 (1886). The case is discussed in J. LANDYNSKI, SUpra note 17, at 49-61.
Before Boyd, only a handful of search and Seizure cases had reached the Supreme
Court. See Exparte Burford, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 448 (1806); Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S.
(18 How.) 71 (1855); Den v. Hoboken Land Co, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855); In re
Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1878). Among the causes of this sparse adjudication were the
reluctance of Congress to exercise its criminal jurisdiction and the unavailability of appeals
to the Supreme Court in criminal cases. J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 17, at 49.
32 Boyd was a case challenging the validity of a federal statute which required defen-
dants in revenue cases to produce business records demanded by the government or else
be taken to admit the government's allegations in the case. Defendants had produced the
demanded invoice but challenged the introduction of such evidence at trial. The Court's
opinion striking down the statute is notable for three points.
First, although it had consistently been assumed that the fourth amendment did not
apply in civil proceedings (see Den v. Hoboken Land Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 285
(1855)), the Court was
clearly of the opinion that proceedings instituted for the purpose of declaring
the forfeiture of a man's property by reason of offenses committed by him,
though they may be civil in form, are in their nature criminal.... The
information, though technically a civil proceeding, is in substance and effect a
criminal one.
116 U.S. at 634.
Having passed this hurdle, there was still some question as to whether an order for the
production of records should be considered a search or seizure.
It is true that certain aggravating incidents of actual search and seizure, such
as forcible entry into a man's house and searching amongst his papers, are
wanting:... but it accomplishes the substantial object .... It is our opinion,
therefore, that a compulsory production of a man's private papers to establish
a criminal charge against him or forfeit his property is within the scope of the
[VOL. 6:154
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case has been immortalized for "the ringing tones of its message
and the grandeur of its passages." 33 In looking to the underlying
principles rather than to the literal language of the amendment,
the case strongly affirmed "the sanctities of a man's home and the
privacies of life," 34 and, in an appropriation of the words of
Justice Story,35 "his indefeasible right of personal security, per-
sonal liberty and private property."
36
Even as Bradley's eloquent statement of this era's philosophy
of individualism was delivered, however, its cultural and ideo-
logical bases were disappearing.3 7 The frontier came to an end;
industrialization, urbanization, and mass immigration drastically
altered the character of American society. 38 Traditional in-
dependence and homogeneity were replaced by growing in-
terdependence and heterogeneity among the population.39 As the
society became increasingly "open," the need for effective "clo-
sure" (privacy) on the part of the individual increased.40 A rapidly
advancing technology changed the quality of necessary privacy as
well, providing new means of communication and new possi-
bilities for their interception, and new opportunities for in-
creasingly subtle invasions of personal privacy.
41
Superimposed on this demographic, cultural, and technological
change was an increasing judicial emphasis on economic lais-
sez-faire and the rights of property at the expense of other person-
al liberties. This led to what Westin has characterized as a "prop-
ertied privacy" outlook among the Justices. 42 As increasing num-
bers of fourth amendment issues reached the Court, a trend given
Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, in all cases in which a search and
seizure would be; because it is a material ingredient and effects the sole
object and purpose of search and seizure.
Id. at 622. The object of the proceedings rather than the method employed was thus held
to be paramount.
Perhaps the most significant obstacle for the petitioners was the then prevailing com-
mon-law rule that competent evidence would be received by the court without regard to
the method by which it was acquired. In reaching the conclusion that admission of the
invoice had been erroneous and required reversal, the Court found that the compelled
production of evidence had violated the fifth as well as the fourth amendment. Thus it was
able not only to void the statute authorizing the warrant, but also to find that the procedure
had compelled self-incriminating testimony. Therefore, there was no need to develop an
exclusionary rule for the fourth amendment. The search was illegal under the fourth
amendment and the admission of its fruits was prohibited by the fifth amendment.
3
3J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 17, at 49.
34 116 U.S. at 630.
35 See note 27 and accompanying text supra.
36 116 U.S. at 630.






Cf. Simmel, supra note 19, at 484.
41 See A. WESTIN, supra note 22, at 338- 39.
42 Id. at 339-41.
Privacy
Journal of Law Reform
great impetus by Prohibition, a bifurcated standard was becoming
evident. Business and property interests received a broad and
emphatic protection from governmental interference, while per-
sonal privacies, particularly in communication, which were not
directly associated with the security of property were viewed
narrowly and hypertechnically. 4A However, since the bulk of
cases coming before the Court involved property rights and the
regulation of business, the overall impression was one of opposi-
tion to governmental interference in private spheres of life.
44
The variety of references to fourth amendment protections
used in earlier cases and commentaries was continued, 45 with an
occasionally greater emphasis on their property aspects. 46 How-
ever, changes occurring in the quality of life in America expanded
the scope of necessary privacy beyond that which derived from
the benefits of a proprietary interest. It was becoming increasingly
clear that the types of search and seizure envisioned by the
founders did not exhaust the possible means by which the rele-
vant "privacies of life" might be violated.47 In most respects this
propertied privacy ended in the late 1930s, 48 but the adjustment
to newly emerging privacy interests was slow.
49
The process by which these expanded interests were acknowl-
43 Id.
44 Neither the privacy aspects of culture, the intellectual climate, the judicial outlook,
nor the developing case law were uniform, unidirectional, or monolithic. As the changing
face of America was reducing old bases of privacy, it was also creating new ones.
Urbanization, for example, increased most people's indifference toward the activities of
others, thus freeing many of them from the strong moral censorship of the community in a
rural setting. Shils, supra note 16, at 288-89. The overall effect, however, despite differing
directions of change, was gradually to increase the valuation of privacy which an earlier
society had taken more or less for granted. This was mirrored in the development of civil
remedies for invasion of privacy. A. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY 169- 70 (197 1).
See generally Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960); Bloustein, Privacy as an
Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 962 (1964);
Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 326 (1966); M. ERNST & A. SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY: THE RIGHT TO BE LET ALONE
(1968).
45 See, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 390 (1914) ("invasions of the home
and privacy of the citizens"); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 304, 305 (1921)
("personal security, personal liberty, and private property"; "security and privacy of the
home or office and of the papers of the owner").
46See, e.g., Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585, 598 (1904) ("The security intended to
be guaranteed by the 4th Amendment against wrongful search and seizures [sic] is
designed to prevent violations of private security in person and property and unlawful
invasion of the sanctity of the home .. "); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74 (1906)
("immunity of himself and his property from arrest or seizure").
47
See generally A. WESTIN, supra note 22, at 65-132, 172-210; E. LONG, THE
INTRUDERS (1967); M. BRENTON, THE PRIVACY INVADERS (1964); V. PACKARD, THE
NAKED SOCIETY (1964):S. DASH, R. SCHWARTZ, & R. KNOWLTON, THE EAVESDROPPERS
(1959).
48 A. WESTIN, supranote 22, at 341-42.
49 See, e.g., Scoular, Wiretapping and Eavesdropping Constitutional Development from
Olmsteadto Katz, 12 ST. Louis U.L.J.513 (1968).
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edged in the courts was marked by an increasing focus on "priva-
cy" as the referent of fourth amendment protections. Beginning
with Brandeis's dissent in Olmstead v. United States,50 in which
he argued for recognition of a broad, nonpropertied interest in
personal integrity, classified under the heading of privacy, refer-
ences gradually became more standardized. 51 In a sense, some of
the more personal libertarian ideals of the earliest era, along with
the continued liberal pronouncements during propertied privacy,
were consolidated in a privacy concept and terminology. Its con-
notations apparently were seen as an increasingly apt reflection of
the evolving scope of the fourth amendment. "The right to priva-
cy" was thus a natural choice for judges seeking to verbalize their
thoughts concerning the nature of its protections.
Clearly the concept of privacy has come to be in some measure
representative of fourth amendment protections and an influential
ideal in the mapping out of its particulars in the modern world.
5 2
To understand the intimate relationship between the concept of
privacy and the fourth amendment and its effects on the course of
the law requires an inquiry into the nature of the concept itself.
2. The Ideal of Privacy-Like liberty, equality, or justice, the
idea of privacy is amorphous, broad in scope, and highly ab-
stract.53 As with many such concepts it has a "commonly accept-
50 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928).
51 See, e.g., United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932) ("The Fourth
Amendment... is construed liberally to safeguard the right of privacy."); Nardone v.
United States, 302 U.S. 379, 383 (1937) ("the Guaranty against practices and procedures
violative of privacy, embodied in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the Constitution");
Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 136 (1942) (Murphy, J., dissenting) ("One of the
great boons secured to the inhabitants of this country by the Bill of Rights is the right of
personal privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment."); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25,
27 (1949) ("The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police-which
is at the core of the Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free society."); United States v.
Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950) ('fC]orporations can claim no equality with
individuals in the enjoyment of a right to privacy" under the fourth amendment.).
52 Consider Justice Black's vigorous dissent in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 373
(1967):
With this decision the Court has completed, I hope, its rewriting of the
Fourth Amendment, which started only recently when the Court began
referring incessantly to the Fourth Amendment not so much as a law against
unreasonable searches and seizures as one to protect an individual's priva-
cy.... Thus, by arbitrarily substituting the Court's language, designed to
protect privacy, for the Constitution's language, designed to protect against
unreasonable searches and seizures, the Court has made the Fourth Amend-
ment its vehicle for holding all laws violative of the Constitution which offend
the Court's broadest concept of privacy.
53 The concept of privacy is difficult to define because it is exasperatingly
vague and evanescent, often meaning strikingly different things to different
people. In part this is because privacy is a notion that is emotional in its
appeal and embraces a multitude of different "rights," some of which are
intertwined, others often seemingly unrelated or inconsistent.
A. MILLER, supra note 44, at 25 (footnote omitted).
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ed core of meaning with an indefinite or variable periphery. ' '5 4 Its
essential substance both at the core and on the periphery con-
cerns the nature of the relationship between an actor (subject,
locus of internal phenomena, point of reference, etc.) who is the
beneficiary of privacy, and his or its environment (situation, set of
external phenomena, world-at-large, etc.). A variety of issues
concerning the autonomy and integrity of the actor vis-b.-vis the
environment may be subsumed under the privacy rubric. In its
most expansive formulations, privacy may be equated with the
whole of personal or group autonomy. 55 More commonly it is
associated with a limited number of these issues. 56
There are three primary components of the privacy concept: (1)
the nature of the entity entitled to protection, (2) the parts of the
environment considered to be relevant objects of protection, and
(3) the types of relations between them to be regulated. All three
of these constituent elements are variables, whose scope may be
expanded or contracted, thus enlarging or narrowing the set of
problems considered to be problems of privacy. If we begin with
a broad definition of privacy, the manner in which it is narrowed
in the constitutional context may be more clearly perceived and
evaluated.
Any entity composed of single or multiple human actors will be
considered an appropriate subject of privacy.5 7 This may include
actors only in certain of their capacities (e.g., we may speak of the
privacy accruing to a person only in and to the extent he occupies
a specific status-role).58 Each subject, however, must be grounded
in a concrete human organism or group of them. 59 Although
subsequent references will be made primarily to individual actors,
similar considerations of identity and the need for privacy apply
54 Pennock, Introduction, inNoMos XIII: PRIVACY at xi (YEARBOOK OF THE AMERI-
CAN SOCIETY FOR POLITICAL AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY, J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds.
1971) [hereinafter cited as NoMos X I I I].
55 See, e.g., Beardsley, Privacy: Autonomy and Selective Disclosure, id.at 56.
56 See generally the essays collected in NoMos XIII, supra note 54, for a variety of
definitional approaches.
57 This would make groups, organizations, collectivities, institutions, social systems,
etc., possible beneficiaries of privacy, but not mere aggregations or classifications of
otherwise unrelated persons. The crucial test of "entivity" is the existence of an in-
terlocking web of roles and norms applicable to the members of the group in their
membership capacities, as well as a fundamental commonality of goals and values, all
ordered within a common (and at some points group-distinctive) culture.
58 Because privacy is a socially generated and regulated phenomenon (see notes 123-25
and accompanying text infra), it is usually attached to generalized categories rather than
specific individuals. Indeed, the classification may be no more distinctive than "citizen,"
"homeowner," etc.
59 Thus it is not the status-role itself to which privacy is ascribed, but the occupant, i.e.,
the person in that role.
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to collectivities. 60 There are differences between them which a
detailed inquiry into privacy might explore, but for present pur-
poses the common treatment does not seriously distort reality.
The boundaries of the protected (private) entity will be those
marked out by the actor's self-concept.61 This includes all aspects
and products of human action which are integral parts of the
egocentric actor's existence as a distinctive human individual. It
represents a complex interfacing of cultural, social, and ecological
forces with the personological (personality) and physiological sys-
tems of the actor. This "total self" is considered to be the subject
(beneficiary) of privacy; its boundaries will constitute the param-
eters of the projected unit of privacy.
William James, in his seminal and still influential chapter on the
self concept, 62 identified four concentric and progressively nar-
rower parts of the self: (1) the material self, (2) the social self, (3)
the spiritual self, and (4) the pure ego. 63 These include, respec-
tively: (1) the body, clothes, family, friends, home, and other
possessions; (2) the attributes and capacities acquired by the
person as a result of interaction with others; (3) the processes of
mentation (cognitive, affective, etc.) normally called the person-
ality; and (4) the naked ego or soul which is the locus of pure
existence and personal identity.6 4
Taking this description as a model, the privacy unit may be said
to consist of a particular personological system (the spiritual self
and pure ego), considered within its socio-cultural matrix (the
social self), and including that actor's6 5 body and posses-
sions-"the class of all those things (words, movements, knowl-
edge, states of mind, material objects, actions) which an individual
or group of individuals generates, makes, or acquires through
legitimate transactions."
6 6
This definition extends beyond what is strictly the "material"
self, for it posits a form of property in incorporeal ideas. Clearly,
6 0 0n the privacy of collectivities, see Simmel, supra note 19, at 483-84; A. WESTIN,
supra note 22, at 42-5 1.
61 See generally Sherif, Self Concept, in 14 SOCIAL SCIENCES, supra note 19, at 150;
See also sources cited in id. at 158-59.
62
W. JAMES, THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY 29 1-401 (1902).
63 Id.at 292.
6 4 Id. at 292-305, 329-73. Some descriptive liberties have been taken here, hopefully
without doing violence to the original intent.
6 The term "actor" will hereinafter be used primarily in reference to the relevant
personological system. The term "privacy unit" will be used in reference to the actor plus
his "extended (social and material) self." This is to distinguish between the subject with
and without his possessions.
66 Shils, supra note 16, at 284.
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much of the information which a person generates is inevitably
transmitted into the public domain. Of course, the social facts of
life preclude isolation of many kinds of intangible possessions.
Yet this renders such intangibles no less a part of personal identi-
ty. Just as physical property is in many ways an extension of the
more intimate self,67 recognized by society as belonging to the
individual actor who makes or acquires it, the incorporeal prod-
ucts of one's existence are also significant components of the self,
and "belong" to their author or recipient.68
Privacy consists in the ability of the actor to maintain the
integrity of his privacy unit. This is his "domain of autonomous
activity ' '69 or "space of free movement, '" 70 the area within the
frontiers of identity 71 which is private insofar as he remains its
master. The permeability of its boundaries is crucial to privacy
but not synonomous with it. The degree to which a unit is closed
(or open) to the environment is a measure of its seclusion or
accessibility. The degree to which the actor controls his unit's
closure is a measure of privacy.72 The distinction is important, for
the two concepts are often confused.
73
A variety of factors limits the potential for both seclusion and
privacy in the human actor. There are limits on the maximum
degree of seclusion because human systems must engage in cer-
tain interchanges with their environments if they are to survive.
74
67 The important and relevant distinction between man and other animals,
only faintly foreshadowed among some apes, lies in the fact that for man
material objects are in essence an extension and definition of personality.
Without being strictly necessary for personal or species survival, many
material objects are used by man to magnify his sense of self...
Beaglehole, Property, in 12 SOCIAL SCIENCES, supra note 19, at 589, 590. This theme is
expanded upon in E. BEAGLEHOLE, PROPERTY: A STUDY IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
295-3 12 (1932).
6 8
See W. JAMES, supra note 62, at 291, 324; Konvitz, Privacy and the Law: A
Philosophical Prelude, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 272, 274-75 (1966).
69 Simmel. supra note 19, at 48 1.
70 Lewin, Some Social-Psychological Differences Between the United States and Ger-
many, in K. LEWIN, RESOLVING SOCIAL CONFLICTS: SELECTED PAPERS ON GROUP DY-
NAMICS 3, 5 (1948).
71 I. BERLIN, Two CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY 5I (1958).
72 Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 482 (1968); Simmel, supra note 19, at 480;
D. MADGWICK, PRIVACY UNDER ATTACK 5 (1968).
73 This is primarily a product of ambiguities in common usage of the word "privacy."
For an examination of these, see Gross, supra note 15, at 34- 40. Of course some authors
have deliberately chosen to define privacy as a kind of seclusion. See, e.g., id. at 36 ("the
condition of human life in which acquaintance with a person or with affairs of his life which
are personal to him is limited"): Shils, supra note 16, at 281 ("a 'zero-
relationship'.., constituted by the absence of interaction or communication or perception
within contexts in which such interaction, communication, or perception is practicable").
The present course, however, seems to admit of greater descriptive flexibility and entail
less confusion.
74 The most obvious of these are biological requirements such as food and oxygen.
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In the language of general systems theory, they are "open" rather
than "closed" systems. There is a range of possible permeability
of their boundaries, violation of which (in the direction either of
extreme openness or extreme closure) results in the death of the
system as a distinct entity.
75
There are also limiting conditions on the exercise of privacy.
Those interchanges with the environment which are necessary for
the system's survival are effectively excluded from the actor's
control, as in a somewhat different sense are those which are
simply impossible. There are other interchanges which, though
neither inevitable nor impossible, are so firmly dictated by the
realities of human existence that they are for all practical pur-
poses entirely removed from the ambit of the actor's discretion.
76
On the other hand, no actor can be completely at the mercy of
external forces without losing his very identity as a human being.
It is only by virtue of the fact that he exercises a certain amount
of control over his own behavior that the actor is recognized as
a functioning entity. And beyond this essential degree of
self-organization, every society recognizes some further matters
of autonomy which go beyond the bare subsistence level. 77 These
are the matters in which a man must have some freedom, else
"life" is transformed into "mere existence.
' 78
Thus both seclusion and privacy are relative concepts. There
are limits beyond which they cannot be applied. Within these
75 Extreme openness, which leads to diffusion into the environment, merges the sys-
tem's identity into that of its surroundings. Extreme closure leads to entropy and death for
the living organism.
76 Many social norms and cultural taboos may be said to fall into this category.
77 The fundamental fact is that our Western culture defines individuality as
including the right to be free from certain types of intrusions. This measure of
personal isolation and personal control over the conditions of its abandon-
ment is of the very essence of personal freedom and dignity, is part of what
our culture means by these concepts. A man whose home may be entered at
the will of another, whose conversation may be overheard at the will of
another, whose marital and familial intimacies may be overseen at the will of
another, is less of a man, has less human dignity, on that account.
Blou stein, supra note 44, at 97 3-74.
78 Cf. Fried, supra note 72, at 477-78:
It is my thesis that privacy is not just one possible means among others to
insure some other value, but that it is necessarily related to ends and rela-
tions of the most fundamental sort: respect, love, friendship and trust. Priva-
cy is not merely a good technique for furthering these fundamental relations:
rather without privacy they are simply inconceivable. They require a context
of privacy-or the possibility of privacy for their existence. To make clear the
necessity of privacy as a context for respect, love, friendship and trust is to
bring out also why a threat to privacy seems to threaten our very integrity as
persons. To respect, love, trust, feel affection for others and to regard
ourselves as the objects of love, trust and affection is at the heart of our
notion of ourselves as persons, and privacy is the necessary atmosphere for
these attitudes and actions, as oxygen is for combustion.
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parameters, however, they are fully variable, and do vary widely
in fact, both among persons and cultures. 79
The ways in which seclusion, and thus privacy, may be violated
are many. Two classes of these are particularly relevant to the
fourth amendment: (1) the self may be invaded by outside forces
which the actor sees as offensive or undesirable, and (2) elements
of the self may become known to or be made use of or taken by
others in a manner which the actor sees as offensive or undesir-
able. The first class will herein be referred to as intrusions or
invasions, the second as appropriations. Although even highly
desirable intrusions or appropriations may technically be said to
violate privacy if they were not "invited" (voluntarily approved
before the fact) because they were not under the actor's control as
they occurred, subsequent approval may be viewed as a sort of
ratification. In any event, they are issues about which we need not
be concerned. They are eliminated from this definition in order to
focus more narrowly on the types of invasions which the actor
would want to control and which are thus most important in
delimiting his right to privacy.
The difference between intrusion and appropriation is some-
times subtle, but always real. Intrusion refers to the inflow of
environmental forces, which are offensive because of their pres-
ence within the privacy unit.80 The power to regulate this inflow
may be referred to as selective admittance. Appropriation is con-
cerned with the outflow of elements internal to the self, which
events are offensive because of the dispersal and loss to the actor
of these elements. 81 The ability to regulate outflow may be re-
79 See generally Spiro, Privacy in Comparative Perspective, NoMos XIII, supra note
54, at 121: Roberts & Gregor, Privacy: A Cultural View, NoMos X I I I, supra note 54, at
199; S. STROMHOLM, RIGHTS OF PRIVACY AND RIGHTS OF PERSONALITY: A COM-
PARATIVE SURVEY (Upsala Institute of Comparative Jurisprudence 1967).
80 "Intrusion by persons, or animals, or machines, or by any objects under the control
of others, violates my privacy, as do noises, odors, images, or communications which
others are in duty bound to control when they affect my private domain." Van den Haag,
On Privacy, NoMos XIII, supra note 54, at 149, 152.
81 Mere unauthorized watching of a private realm or activity deprives the
watched of his mental property by curtailing the exclusiveness of his access
to, or disposal of, his self....
Utilization of the private realm concerns publications about it, true or
false ... [S]uch publications violate my privacy.., because they diminish
that control over my image in other people's minds, to which I am entitled by
virtue of my exclusive disposal of access to my private domain.
Id. at 151-52.
There are few men who would not feel personally annihilated if a life-long
construction of their hands or brains-say an entomological collection or an
extensive work in manuscript-were suddenly swept away. The miser feels
similarly towards his gold, and although it is true that a part of our depression
at the loss of possessions is due to our feeling that we must now go without
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ferred to as the power of selective dissemination. Although it is
possible for an environmental force to appropriate almost any
element of the self, as, for example, by defaming the social self or
brainwashing the personality, it is retention of possessions with
which we are most concerned. Perhaps the most important pos-
session for preservation of privacy is information about the priva-
cy unit. Indeed, "the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions
to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent in-
formation about them is communicated to others,"8 2 is the most
common definition of privacy. 83 This particular type of selective
dissemination may be called selective disclosure. In sum, effective
control over one's privacy unit requires that the actor be able to
maintain it intact against both incursions from outside and losses
of its content.
8 4
In most cases, intrusions and appropriations will occur in a
continuous or related series of events. Information not voluntarily
disclosed is generally obtained by means of some sort of intrusion,
even if it is only the extension of another person's senses by
means of media such as light or sound waves. Conversely, most
intrusions significant enough to be considered offensive are likely
to produce at least a small harvest of information for the sentient
intruder. The extent to which the two types of integrity of the
privacy unit are violated may, however, vary greatly between
different series of events. It is not the eavesdropper's intruding
ear which is most offensive, but the fact that restricted in-
formation has been illicitly appropriated. And while the blunder-
ing constable may invade one's home and learn little of impor-
tance, his heavy-handed presence may in itself be highly objec-
tionable.
certain goods that we expected the possessions to bring in their train, yet in
every case there remains, over and above this, a sense of the shrinkage of our
personality, a partial conversion of ourselves to nothingness, which is a
psychological phenomenon by itself.
W. JAMES, supra note 62, at 293.
82 A. WESTIN, supranote 22, at 7.
83 "Of late .... lawyers and social scientists have been reaching the conclusion that the
basic attribute of an effective right of privacy is the individual's ability to control the
circulation of information relating to him .... " A. MILLER, supra note 44, at 25.
84 A similar definition is offered by Professor Beaney in The Right to Privacy and
American Law, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 253, 254 (1966):
Therefore a right to privacy as a legal concept can be defined as the legally
recognized freedom or power of an individual (group, association, class) to
determine the extent to which another individual group, class, asosciation, or
government) may (a) obtain or make use of his ideas, writings, name, like-
ness, or other indicia of identity, or (b) obtain or reveal information about
him or those for whom he is personally responsible, or (c) intrude physically
or in more subtle ways into his life space and his chosen activities.
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It becomes apparent that the elements in the environment
which are most relevant to the two types of invasions are some-
what different. Nearly anything may accomplish an intrusion,
including intangibles such as offensive ideas. These, however,
may be identified with the physical stimuli by which they are
transmitted to the actor. In practical terms, intrusions are made
by sensible empirical phenomena, which may or may not be of
human origin. On the other hand, appropriations are primarily
made by other human actors. Certainly it is possible for other
forces to extract material things from a privacy unit, as, for
example, if a flood were to carry away one's house; but in most
cases it is dissemination to other people that is important.
The types of interchange across the boundaries of the self
which must be controlled to effectuate privacy may be character-
ized according to their modality and substance. Modality of an
interchange distinguishes between inflow of environmental forces
and outflow of internal elements, and between those interchanges
which are and are not offensive to the actor. Substance is a
residual category containing all other attributes of an event which
serve to differentiate it from the universe of events. In short,
substance is what has gone in or out, and modality is which way it
went and whether the actor liked it or not. Privacy is a function of
these plus the actor's control over the event. This control will
vary with both modality and substance. The ways in which it
varies will determine the contours of privacy available to any
given actor.
II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF
PRIVACY AGAINST SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
The reasons, both historical and definitional, for employing the
phrase "right to privacy" in reference to fourth amendment pro-
tections should now be a bit clearer. Changing socio-cultural
realities have produced changes in the needs for and the nature of
personal autonomy.a5 As the Court adapted the regulation of
searches and seizures to these emerging needs, it became in-
creasingly obvious that both old and new types of protection fit
very nicely within the privacy rubric. It seems intuitively to
capture the rationale, the raison d'etre, of the amendment. 86 "The
85 See part I B I supra.
86 In a very real sense, the Fourth Amendment embodies a spiritual concept:
the belief that to value the privacy of home and person and to afford it
constitutional protection against the long reach of government is no less than
to value human dignity, and that this privacy must not be disturbed except in
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right of the people to be secure in their units of privacy against
unreasonable intrusions into them or appropriations of their con-
tent shall not be violated," recasts the constitutional language in
the broad terminology necessary to understand the proper role of
the fourth amendment in modern society. This is all at a fairly
superficial level, however. More important is a consideration of
what effects this mode of thinking may have had and should have
upon the actual administration of the fourth amendment prohibi-
tion.
It is at this level that the skywriting has not been broken down
satisfactorily. The "pernicious ambiguities"8 7 attaching to a con-
cept as natively vague and amorphous as privacy have tended to
fuzz and muddle legal thinking and expression on the subject.
8 8
Courts and commentators have used "privacy" in at least four
distinct ways: (1) as a broad, open-ended expression for any or all
aspects of personal integrity and autonomy; 9 (2) as an expression
of those ideals which are specifically embodied in the fourth
amendment, to the exclusion of those other facets of open-ended
privacy which are not legally protected, or are protected by other
legal devices; 90 (3) as an operational category representing the
case of overriding social need, and then only under stringent procedural
safeguards.
J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 17, at 47. This idea has been nowhere more eloquently
expressed than by Justice Brandeis, dissenting in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 478 (1928):
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to
the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual
nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the
pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They
sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions
and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to
be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the
Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means em-
ployed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
87 Gross, supra note 15, at 35.
88 See id. at 39-40.
"If anything is absolute with respect to this 'most comprehensive right,' it is that
confusion permeates all of its theories. Few concepts are more vague, or less amenable to
definition or application." Note, Assault Upon Solitude-A Remedy?, I I SANTA CLARA
LAWYER 109, 110 (1970) (footnote omitted).
This confusion in the law is merely reflective of a similar bemusement on the part of
philosophers and social scientists generally. "Most of the work on privacy ... suffer[s], as
Hyman Gross has pointed out [supra note 151, from the lack of any understanding of the
essential characteristics of privacy." Silber, Masks and Fig Leaves, in NoMos XIIi, supra
note 54, at 226, 227. "Few values so fundamental to society as privacy have been left so
undefined in social theory or have been the subject of such'vague and confused writing by
social scientists." A. WESTIN, supra note 22, at 7.
89 "Virtually every governmental action interferes with personal privacy to some degree.
The question in each case is whether that interference violates a command of the United
States Constitution." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 n.5 (1967).
90 "[Tihe role of the Fourth Amendment [is] to protect against invasions of privacy. ...
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types of fact situations in which a court will or should recognize
that an intrusion or appropriation constitutes a search or seiz-
ure; 91 and (4) as a second and narrower operational category of
fact situations in which a search or seizure, if it occurred, would
be constitutionally unreasonable. 92 The first two kinds of refer-
ences are to abstract principles, the second one being limited to
the values and goals of the fourth amendment. The last two refer
to the concrete norms by which those values and goals are to be
enforced, the difference being that while invasions of the third sort
of privacy may or may not be prohibited (depending upon their
characterization as reasonable or not), the fourth refers only to
unreasonable invasions of the autonomies of life. When it is
necessary to distinguish between them, they will be referred to as
general, ideal, recognized, and enforceable93 privacy respectively.
Additionally, the first two and the last two may be grouped under
the headings of conceptual and functional privacy. The last three
will be designated fourth amendment privacy.
Ideal privacy, as the postulated goal of the amendment, is
translated into functional rights by decisions as to (a) the types of
privacy units to be protected, and (b) the quality of privacy which
will be enforced therein, including (i) the modality and substance
of relevant violations, (ii) the permissibility of those violations,
and (iii) the legal effect of impermissible violations. Theoretically,
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 305 (1967). But see Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 350- 51 (1967) (footnotes omitted):
[T]he Fourth Amendment cannot be translated into a general constitutional
"right to privacy." That Amendment protects individual privacy against
certain kinds of governmental intrusion .... Other provisions of the Con-
stitotion protect personal privacy from other forms of governmental invasion.
But the protection of a person's general right to privacy-his right to be let
alone by other people- is ... left largely to the law of the individual States.
See also note 86 supra.
91 This represents the empirical counterpart of the second category, i.e., the actual
circumstances where the amendment's concept of privacy may be said to exist and in
which violations thus rise to the level of constitutional searches or seizures.
92 Hence this species of privacy, unlike that in the third category, is not violated by any
search or seizure, but only unreasonable ones. Cf. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471, 492 (1963): "The seizure of this heroin invaded no right of privacy of person or
premises which would entitle Wong Sun to object to its use at his trial."
93 The proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures is not actually enforced in
every instance where it may be potentially enforceable. This results from certain restric-
tions on the scope of the exclusionary rule, such as the standing requirement (see, e.g.,
Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165
(1969)), discovery of evidence through an independent source (see Silverthorne Lumber
Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920)), dissipation of "taint" through attenuation (see
Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939)), use of evidence for impeachment
purposes (see Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954)), and the doctrine of harmless




these decisions may be separated into three stages. 94 First, in
each case a threshold determination must be made on whether the
given fact situation is within the scope of the amendment, i.e., a
decision as to the applicability of its provisions to the particular
circumstances. This requires a finding of whether a con-
stitutionally recognized right of privacy has been violated (deci-
sions (a) and (b)(i)). If so, this violation is a search or seizure, and
it must be tested for its adherence to prescribed ("reasonable")
standards of conduct, that is, actual application of the amendment
to determine the permissibility of the search or seizure (decision
(b)(ii) ).95 The final step is for the court to apply those rules which
specify the legal effect of an impermissible search or seizure, i.e.,
ultimate enforcement of the amendment?6
The last two stages represent the transformation of recognized
privacy into enforceable privacy. Although the procedures in
these areas are only slightly less confused than at the first stage, it
is in assessing applicability that there is the greatest lack of
theoretic perspective, 97 and it is there that conceptual privacy is
most important. For these reasons, this suggested analytical
framework will be limited to questions of applicability.
To ascertain when the constitutional strictures are applicable
94 This process is discernible in rough form in certain cases, e.g., Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), but it is never explicitly discussed. A somewhat abbreviated
statement of this model may be found in Comment, The Applicability of the "New" Fourth
Amendment to Investigations by Secret Agents: A Proposed Delineation of the Emerging
Fourth Amendment Right to Privacy, 45 WASH. L. REv. 785, 786-88 (1970). See also A.
Amsterdam, Federal Constitutional Restraints on Search, Seizure, Arrest, Detention and
Interrogation by State Law Enforcement Officers, at 4, Feb. 5, 1966 (unpublished note in
University of Michigan Law Library).
95 Application requires consideration of the necessity and validity of arrest and search
warrants (see, e.g., United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (197 1); Spinelli v. United States,
393 U.S. 410 (1969)), classes of intrusions permissible without warrant (see Vale v.
Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970)), including arrests and detentions (see Davis v. Mississippi,
394 U.S. 721 (1969)), searches incident to arrest (see Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752
(1969)), frisks (see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)), threatened destruction or removal
of evidence, especially in the case of automobiles (see Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42
(1970); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971)), hot pursuit (see Warden v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967)), and emergencies (see Vale v. Louisiana, 389 U.S. 30
(1970) ), and their specific criteria, including probable cause.
96 Enforcement refers to the administration of the exclusionary rule (see note 93 supra)
and possible affirmative actions, such as an award of damages (see Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)) or injunction (see Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d
197 (4th Cir. 1966) ).
97 In this century, the leading issues pertaining to the fourth amendment have
fallen into two categories: enforcement of its prohibitions and the definition
of its reach. While the problems of enforcement have arisen in a procedural
setting and guidelines have been judicially drawn, the boundaries of the
amendment's reach are as yet undefined.
Note, Wyman v. James: Is a Man's Home Still His Castle?, 10 J. FAMILY L. 460, 463
(1971).
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the court must determine whether recognized privacy has been
violated, or stated differently, whether a search or seizure has
occurred. The factors affecting this decision are of two sorts. The
first consists of those conditions which are necessary to the exis-
tence of a search or seizure. Applying the previously constructed
paradigm for general privacy, these are: (1) a privacy unit, (2) an
environmental agency, and (3) an intrusive or appropriative act of
(2) against (1). In the fourth amendment context each of these is
given a specialized definition of limited scope.
Even when these definitions are met, however, applicability is
not assured. Inquiry into two other elements is required to deter-
mine if they will prove sufficient: (4) the kind of control over his
privacy unit which the occupant was entitled to have exercised,
and (5) the extent to which such control was in fact exercised.
Factors (1) through (3) "set the stage," as it were, by defining the
relevant framework for fourth amendment privacy, while (4) and
(5) specify the conditions and quality of seclusion which will be
recognized within those. parameters.
A. Necessary Elements
1. Private Areas and Private Affairs- At the outset, it is essen-
tial to distinguish between the content and the boundaries of the
relevant privacy units. Their content-that which may be appro-
priated or which may suffer an intrusion-may be tangible or
intangible. Information as well as physical objects may be private
and protected. 98 A person's consciousness may be invaded as well
as his house. However, no content of a person's privacy unit, no
part of his self, is recognized as private under the fourth amend-
ment unless its physical manifestations are contained within a
private place.99 The boundaries of a privacy unit must be physi-
98 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
99 This is the position taken explicitly by Justice Harlan, concurring in Katz v. United
States:
I join the opinion of the Court, which I read to hold only (a) that an enclosed
telephone booth is an area where, like a home .... a person has a con-
stitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy; [and] (b) that elec-
tronic as well as physical intrusion into a place that is in this sense private
may constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment ....
As the Court's opinion states, "the Fourth Amendment protects people,
not places." The question, however, is what protection it affords to those
people. Generally, as here, the answer to that question requires reference to
a "place."
389 U.S. at 360-61.
This should not be taken to mean that a private place is necessarily a material enclosure.
The point is that privacy is not protected in the abstract, by saying, for example, that
certain types of conversations are always inviolate; rather the question of whether or not
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cal, i.e., specifically locatable in space-time. Conversations in
open, public areas do not create constitutionally private posses-
sions in their content, even though they may be as much a part of
the speaker's extended self as words whispered in the closet. The
crucial difference is that the latter originate within the boundaries
of a private place, while the former do not. The spatial-temporal
coordinates of an actor's privacy unit, which mark the physical
parameters of its protection, will be termed private areas. The
contents of a privacy unit which are protected within a private
area will be referred to as private affairs.
The physical dimension of functional fourth amendment priva-
cy is a practical necessity, a recognition that, at least as regards
searches and seizures, there is no other viable dividing line be-
tween what will be protected as private and what will not. It
would be simply impossible to recognize a person's right to de-
mand that the courts enforce a cloud of seclusion enveloping all
the affairs of his life. Nevertheless, this has been a point of some
confusion, stemming largely from Justice Stewart's rather loose
use of language in Katz v. United States.l0 0 That case rejected the
then prevailing doctrine of "constitutionally protected areas,"
substituting the oft-quoted aphorism that "the Fourth Amendment
protects people, not places." 10 1 Of course people are the ben-
eficiaries of its protection, and this may include even intaaigible
parts of the extended self; but as long as the focus is upon
prohibited actions, the mechanics of applying the fourth amend-
ment must of necessity be concerned with protecting private
protection should be granted is determined by the surrounding circumstances, and these
circumstances necessarily involve the physical manifestations and situation of whatever
element of the self is to be protected.
[D]etermination as to whether the area in question is or is not con-
stitutionally protected is necessary. It is a mistake to view Katz as eliminat-
ing the latter possibility-all Katz dispensed with was slavish adherence to
the technicalities of state trespass law.
Comment, Criminal Law: Unreasonable Visual Observation Held to Violate Fourth
Amendment, 55 MINN. L. REV. 1255, 1263 (1971) (footnotes omitted). See also Note,
supra note 14, at 982-87; Hendricks, Eavesdropping, Wiretapping, and the Law of Search
and Seizure-Some Implications of the Katz Decision, 9AR!Z. L. REV. 428, 434 (1968).
In fact it is nearly impossible to discuss privacy in this context without considering
where an element of the self was located when intruded upon or appropriated. See, e.g.,
Kitch, Katz v. United States: The Limits of the Fourth Amendment, 1968 SUP. CT. REV.
133, 136-40, where the author notes the ambiguity of the Katz opinion regarding the
scope of fourth amendment protections and hints that it might allow expansion beyond
areal concepts. But his discussion is framed almost entirely to take account of the places
where private affairs exist or occur. Even the opinion of the Court in Katz was unable to
formulate its test of protection without referring to an area: 'IW]hat [a person] seeks to
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally
protected." 389 U.S. at 351-52.
100 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
101 Id. at 351.
Privacy
Journal of Law Reform
places. One simply cannot pretend at will that the rest of the
world does not exist and then enforce this pretension in court.
Reality is, in such matters, quite unyielding. And the courts,
despite contrary assertions, have uniformly continued to treat
searches and seizures as violations of private places. What have
changed are the standards for determining private areas, as well as
those for determining private affairs.
A private area may be created by any element of the self which
manifests physical attributes, though its existence is not entirely
dependent upon corporeal occupation or enclosure of the area. All
material possessions may constitute private areas. However, un-
enclosed space, such as that over a plot of land, may also be a
private area. In certain cases these will be "supporting spaces"
around certain protected objects.
10 2
The existence and extent of private areas are determined by the
nature of the relationship of the actor and of society to the place
in question.' 03 No area is inherently private. Rather, it is pro-
tected because it falls within the actor's unit of privacy and
concurrently outside the "space of free movement" of society in
general. Only when his interest in the area is sufficient to
differentiate him from every other person, by virtue of some
distinctive connection between person and place, will he be ac-
corded protection therein. This is a largely self-evident principle;
for if the individual had no greater interest in a place than the
general public, there could be no basis for preferring his claim to
privacy over that of any other person. It is the nature of this
relationship and more particularly the sort of interest which
suffices to produce it which identify a place as private.' 0 4
102 The prime example of this is the common-law concept of curtilage, which the courts
have adapted and continued to enforce as a protected area surrounding one's house. See,
e.g., United States v. Molkenbur, 430 F.2d 563 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied 400 U.S. 952
(1970).
Although humans, along with most animals, require and customarily mark off and
enforce a personal space around the body, entry into which is socially and sometimes
physically restricted (see R. ARDREY, THE TERRITORIAL IMPERATIVE (1966)), the courts
do not seem to have enforced its boundaries, perhaps because, unlike the curtilage, it is not
an area in which one has a proprietary interest. The outer boundaries of the body seem to
be drawn at the limits of one's clothing. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
103 "It is not the nature of the area ... but the relationship between the area and the
person incriminated by the search that is critical." Kitch, supra note 99, at 136.
104 Much of the law on this issue has been developed as a result of the need of
defendants to show standing to avail themselves of the exclusionary rule. Following the
introduction of the exclusionary rule into the federal courts in 1914 (Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) ), the lower courts immediately began to limit its operation.
The concept of fourth amendment privacy as a "personal privilege" was first applied in
Haywood v. United States, 268 F. 795 (7th Cir. 1920). J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 17, at
74. Broadly stated, it requires that the movant (for suppression) have had a personal
privacy interest in the area searched or seized. The fact of an encroachment upon someone
[VOL. 6:154
FALL 1972] Privacy
It is apparent that property law, which formalizes an extensive
network of person-place relationships, will greatly influence the
nature of privacy interests. To the extent that it accurately reflects
a societal ordering of claims upon the use of an area, it will be
dispositive. However, it has proven exceedingly inadequate in
certain aspects, especially in dealing with casual and permissive
arrangements. Nevertheless, for many years it was the only stan-
dard. 10 5 Privacy was in effect little more than a property right,
generated as much by one's estate in land as by the Constitution.
The Supreme Court indicated as early as 1920 that enforce-
ment of the fourth amendment was not restricted to remedies
available at common law, 106 but it was not until 1960, in Jones v.
United States,10 7 that the Court reached a similar conclusion
regarding its substantive coverage.' 0 8 And even then the process
of deemphasizing the property law influence advanced rather
slowly. As late as 1967, in Warden v. Hayden,0 9 the Court felt
compelled to reassert vigorously its abandonment of criteria based
solely on property interests." 0 It was not immediately clear,
else's privacy is considered to be irrelevant to the movant's case. See Alderman v. United
States, 394 U.S. 165 (1967). The practical result was a line of cases seeking to delineate
the nature of a privacy interest.
105 Prior to 1960, with minor variations, a proprietary or present possessory interest was
a sine qua non for standing to assert the exclusionary rule. Those without substantial
property rights-guests, invitees, employees, trespassers-were similarly without fourth
amendment protection. See, e.g., cases cited and discussion in Jones v. United States, 362
U.S. 257, 265-66 (1960); Annot., Interest in Property Seized, 96 L. Ed. 66 (1951);
Edwards, Standing to Suppress Unreasonably Seized Evidence, 47 Nw. U.L. REV. 471
(1952). The reliance on property law is equally evident in such practices as limiting
protection to the curtilage of a dwelling and to physical trespasses against property (see
note 102 supra).
106 In Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920), the Court
reversed a contempt citation issued for refusal to produce certain books and papers
because the subpoena was drawn upon information illegally obtained. Gouled v. United
States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921), recognized that unlawfully seized papers could be suppressed
at trial despite the acquiesced-in denial of defendant's pre-trial motion for their return. As
noted in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304-05 (1967), the remedies in these cases go
well beyond what would have been possible at common law, i.e., an action in trespass or
replevin.
107 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
1o We do not lightly depart from this course of decisions by the lower courts.
We are persuaded, however, that it is unnecessary and ill-advised to import
into the law surrounding the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures subtle distinctions, developed and refined by the com-
mon law in evolving the body of private property law which, more than
almost any other branch of law, has been shaped by distinctions whose
validity is largely historical .... Distinctions such as those between "lessee,"
"licensee," "invitee" and "guest," often only of gossamer strength, ought not
to be determinative in fashioning procedures ultimately referable to con-
stitutional safeguards.
Id. at 266.
109 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
110 The premise that property interests control the right of the Government to
search and seize has been discredited. Searches and seizures may be "unrea-
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however, just what form the replacement would take. Katz v.
United States,"' written later in 1967, drew a distinction between
what a person knowingly exposes to the public and what he seeks
to preserve as private;"12 but it is obvious that one might still seek
privacy in inappropriate places.
A subsequent formulation, based upon a suggestion in Justice
Harlan's concurring opinion in Katz," 3 asserts that the right to
privacy exists wherever an individual may harbor an expectation
of privacy which society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.
The Court, in subsequent cases, has adopted "reasonable ex-
pectations" as the test of a private area,1 4 and this formulation
now appears firmly entrenched. Yet despite its obvious impor-
tance, very little attention has been given, either in cases or
commentary, to explaining this standard or defining its essential
elements. 115 Typically, it is applied ipse dixit, without discussion
of the court's reasons for considering the defendant's expectations
of privacy to be reasonable or not."1
6
The meaning of reasonableness which clearly emerges from its
use in this context is a specification of something which is deemed
sonable" within the Fourth Amendment even though the Government asserts
a superior property interest at common law. We have recognized that the
principal object of the Fourth Amendment is the protection of privacy rather
than property, and have increasingly discarded fictional and procedural bar-
iers rested on property concepts.
Id. at 304.
111389 U.S. 347 (1967).
112 What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.... But what he
seeks to preserve private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be
constitutionally protected.
Id. at 351-52.
113 My understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that
there is a two-fold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one
that society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable."
Id. at 36 1. The subjective element of this test translates as a question of whether or not the
actor has consented to the violation in question, either explicitly or implicitly. Note,
however, that both an objectively private area and nonconsent to violation are essential to
finding enforceable privacy, but nonconsent is not essential to a finding of recognized
privacy.
114See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368-69
(1968); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 179 n.l 1 (1969).
115 The criticism of the court's opinion in State v. Bryant, 287 Minn. 205, 177 N.W.2d
800 (1970), made in Comment, supra note 99, at 1263, is applicable to most cases in the
area:
The Bryant court arrived at the correct conclusion for the correct reasons,
but avoided the opportunity, if not the responsibility, to define a more
workable rule for delineating a protected zone of privacy. The court seems
carefully to avoid specifying any test or standard beyond the skeletal and
ambiguous criteria specified in Katz to determine whether a person has or
should have a "reasonable expectation of privacy."
116 See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 448 F.2d 963, 971 (9th Cir. 1971).
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rational, proper, acceptable, or permissible in a given situation. It
refers to something, here an expectation, which is valid or makes
sense in its particular circumstances. This usage of reason-
ableness is very similar to its meaning in the substantive criminal
law.' 17 This is also very close to the test of the reasonable man in
tort law, where reasonableness equals behavior which is in accord
with community standards for acceptable conduct. 1 8
This must be distinguished from the reasonableness of an ac-
complished search or seizure, by which the search or seizure is
tested for its adherence to the requirements of the fourth amend-
ment. Instead of applying either actual or ideal standards of con-
duct which are part of the fabric of social and cultural patterns of
life in the community, that test requires a balancing of the in-
terests and rights involved in order to reach what is seen as an
optimal accommodation of the competing interests of personal
privacy and law enforcement.11 9 In this latter case there is no
specific requirement that community preferences (as opposed to
the community's best interests) be consulted. The crucial ques-
tion, though, concerns the authority by which such judgments are
made. Who determines what is reasonable? "We have to look for
the answer to this question in the structure of society, the patterns
of interaction, the web of norms and values." 120 Two factors
strongly indicate the actor's social milieu as the proper source for
expectations of privacy. Beginning with Justice Harlan's assertion
in Katz that the standard should be what "society is prepared to
recognize as 'reasonable,' " 121 courts, when they have considered
the matter, seem to have drawn upon the customs and sensibilities
of the populace in determining what expectations of privacy are
constitutionally reasonable. 22 Secondly, the realization of privacy
117 "An act is reasonable in law when it is such as a man of ordinary care, skill, and
prudence would do under similar circumstances." Howard, The Reasonableness of Mis-
take in the Criminal Law, 4 U. OF QUEENSLAND L.i. 45 (1961).
11 8
See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 149-51 (4th ed. 197 1).
119 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
12 0 Simmel, Privacy is not an Isolated Freedom, in NoMos X1ii, supra note 54, at 71,
84.
121 389 U.S. at 361 (emphasis supplied).
122 [T~he teaching ofKatz v. United States ... [is] that the interest protected by
the Fourth Amendment is reasonable expectation of privacy. Thus to ascer-
tain what constitutes an unreasonable search the court must evaluate a
person's efforts to insure the privacy of an area or activity in view of both
contemporary norms of social conduct and the imperatives of a viable demo-
cratic society.
... [U]nder Katz, an agent is permitted the same license to intrude as a
reasonably respectful citizen would take. Therefore, the nature of the prem-
ises inspected-e.g., whether residential, commercial, inhabited or aban-
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is itself very much a product of life in a human community, a3
made possible through the operation of socialization and social
controls. 124 The quantity and quality of seclusion available to an
individual or group are socially and culturally determined, and in
that sense society and culture may be said to dictate what sorts of
privacy one may reasonably expect, at least in social situations. 125
Thus the appropriate frame of reference is a collective one. The
criteria for reasonable expectations must be abstracted from the
flow of life, and it is the judge's task to find and articulate those
societal standards.
2. Agents of Intrusion and Appropriation-Burdeau v.
McDowell, 126 decided in 1921, was the Supreme Court's first and
only consideration of the issue of who might effect a con-
stitutionally prohibited search or seizure. The Court concluded
that the fourth amendment's
protection applies [only] to governmental action. Its origin
and history clearly show that it was intended as a restraint
upon the activities of sovereign authority, and was not in-
tended to be a limitation upon other than governmental
agencies .... 127
Lower courts have, with only isolated exceptions, 128 adhered to
doned-is decisive; it determines the extent of social inhibition on natural
curiosity, and, inversely, the degree of care required to insure privacy.
United States v. Vilhotti, 323 F. Supp. 425, 431 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
123 Privacy, no less than good reputation or physical safety, is a creature of life
in a human community and not the contrivance of a legal system concerned
with its protection. We should not be misled, therefore, in speaking of a
legally recognized interest in privacy or the rights attending it. Privacy in
these contexts does not exist because of such recognition, but depends only
upon habits of life.
Gross, supra note 15, at 36. See also Roberts & Gregor, Privacy: A Cultural View, in
NoMos XiI, supra note 54, at 199; A. WESTIN, supra note 22, at 8-22; Fried, supra note
72, at 486- 89.
124 Simmel, supra note 120, at 77- 78, 80.
125 See Note, supra note 14, at 984; D. MADGWICK, supra note 72, at 5-6.
126256 U.S. 465 (1921).
127 Id. at 475.
128 See, e.g., Lowry v. State, 42 Okla. Crim. 326, 276 P. 513 (1929) (evidence seized by
private citizens breaking into defendant's car held inadmissible in criminal prosecution);
Del Presto v. Del Presto, 92 N.J. Super. 305, 223 A.2d 217 (1966) (evidence seized by
private citizens breaking into defendant's home held inadmissible in divorce action);
Williams v. Williams, 8 Ohio Misc. 156, 221 N.E.2d 622 (1966) (evidence seized by
defendant from plaintiff's car held inadmissible in divorce action); Sackler v. Sackler, 33
Misc. 2d 600, 224 N.Y.S.2d 790 (Sup. Ct.) (New York statute, identical in language to
Fourth Amendment, held applicable to private citizens), rev'd, 16 App. Div. 2d 423, 229
N.Y.S.2d 61 (1962), aff'd, 15 N.Y.2d 40, 203 N.E.2d 481, 255 N.Y.S.2d 83 (1964);
Lebel v. Swincicki, 354 Mich. 427, 93 N.W.2d 281 (1958) (evidence of blood sample
taken from unconscious defendant held inadmissible in negligence action).
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this policy,12 9 and despite continued criticism' 30 the Burdeau rule
is still good law. The practical issues in this area revolve not
around the rule's viability, for it seems unlikely that it will soon be
overruled, but around its scope.
It has been generally recognized that the government may act
through persons other than its formally designated officers and
employees.' 3 ' The difficulty has usually been in specifying what
sort of relationship between a person and the government is
sufficient to render him its agent for purposes of the fourth amend-
ment. The basic idea is that a person who acts for the government
should be considered its agent. "Acting for" in this sense does not
mean that either the private party or the government officers must
have a subjective understanding that the act is to be done for the
government's benefit, though personal expectations are certainly
important; rather it must appear that there was an actual and
foreseeable cause and effect relationship between a clearly gov-
ernmental action and a private search or seizure.'
3 2
Direct participation of persons who are unquestionably govern-
mental agents may also operate to bring an otherwise private
violation of privacy within the amendment. 3 3 If governmental
participation is evident throughout the transaction, it will be char-
acterized as a "joint activity" and subjected to constitutional
scrutiny. 3 4 Even where the police do not directly aid in an appro-
priation, but only supervise, observe, permit, or acquiesce in one
by a private person, they may nevertheless be held accountable
for it.135 This is the case whenever the private activity constitutes
129 See, e.g., United States v. McGuire, 381 F.2d 306 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 1053 (1968); United States v. Goldberg, 330 F.2d 30 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
953 (1964); Watson v. United States, 391 F.2d 927 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 985
(1968); Eisentrager v. Hocker, 450 F.2d 490 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Hodges,
448 F.2d 1309 (6th Cir. 1971). But see United States v. Chodak, 68 F. Supp. 455 (D. Md.
1946).
130 See, e.g., Black, Burdeau v. McDowell-A Judicial Milepost on the Road to Absolut-
ism, 12 B.U.L. REV. 32 (1932); Comment, Unreasonable Private Searches and Seizures
and the Exclusionary Rule, 16 AM. U.L. REV. 403 (1967): Note, The Fourth Amendment
Right of Privacy: Mapping the Future, 53 VA. L. REV. 1314 (1967); Comment, Private
Party Searches and Seizures--A Province of the Fifth Amendment, 3 U. SAN. FRAN. L.
REV. 159 (1968); Note, A Comment on the Exclusion of Evidence Wrongfully Obtained by
Private Individuals, 1966 UTAH L. REV. 27 I.
1
3 1 See Annot., 36 A.L.R.3d 553, 590 (1971).
132 See Comment, Police Bulletins and Private Searches, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 163 (1970).
33 An extensive discussion and illustration of both forms of governmental involvement
(by agency and direct participation) may be found in Corngold v. United States, 367 F.2d
I (9th Cir. 1966).
134 Stapleton v. Superior Court, 70 Cal. 2d 97, 100, 447 P.2d 967, 969, 73 Cal. Rptr.
575,577 (1968).
135 Id. at 103, 447 P.2d at 970-71, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 578-79; Moody v. United States,
163 A.2d 337 (D.C. Ct. App. 1960).
Privacy
Journal of Law Reform
an illegal act which the police have a duty to prevent and they are
in a position to do so but deliberately refrain from acting. It is
only when a person obtains evidence solely upon his own in-
itiative and without governmental assistance that the govern-
ment's acceptance and use of it will be unobjectionable.1
3 6
3. Characterizing Violations of Privacy- Searches and Seiz-
ures-The fourth amendment admits of two ways in which recog-
nized privacy may be violated -searches and seizures. They rep-
resent, respectively, intrusion into a private area and appropria-
tion of private areas or affairs. A search is offensive and violates
privacy because of the undesired presence of the intruder.' 3 7 Any
impingement upon a private area which is capable of. recognition
by the occupant may constitute a search. A seizure is offensive
because of a complete or partial transfer of a recognized private
possession outside the occupant's control. Whenever an agency
causes such a transfer to be made, it has seized the possession
thereby transferred. This applies, of course, to both tangible and
intangible possessions.3 8
a. Searches- Searches may be described as falling along a
continuum running from significant and obvious corporeal in-
trusions to invasions by intangibles. The former include the most
common situation in which a person, usually a police officer,
enters a private area wholly (e.g., walking into a house) or in part
(e.g., reaching into a pocket). This, would also include entry of
other material objects under governmental control, such as a
microphone or camera. Their presence would be per se objec-
tionable wholly apart from any information-gathering activities.
Invasion by intangibles is represented by the "presence" of one
who has "entered" the area with his senses and can thus perceive
some or all of what exists or transpires within. Certainly the more
136 The only case which seems to have indicated any substantial doubts about this rule is
Knoll Associates, Inc. v. FTC, 397 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1968), implying that a person's
intent to aid the government, coupled with the latter's knowing acceptance and approval of
illegally obtained evidence, is adequate grounds for exclusion. However the facts of this
case were presented in a manner which was sufficiently ambiguous to admit of the
possibility that a more conventional agency relationship did in fact exist. See Note, 44
N.Y.U.L. REV. 206 (1969).
137Cf. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 57 (1963) (Brennan, J., separate opinion) (foot-
note omitted): "Innocent citizens should not suffer the shock, fright or embarrassment
attendant upon an unannounced police intrusion."
138 "[T]he protections of the fourth amendment are surely not limited to tangibles, but
can extend as well to oral statements." Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 301 (1966);
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 52 (1967); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,
485 (1963).
We adhere to the established view in this Court that the right to be secure in
one's house against unauthorized intrusion is not limited to protection against
a policeman viewing or seizing tangible property....
Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 179 (1969).
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important part of such a violation is in the appropriation of in-
formation accomplished by this intrusion. Nevertheless, the "in-
truding ear," for example, is generally recognized, as a very real
presence when within a private area, and its entry is thus recog-
nized as a search.' 3 9
Of course, this characterization of searches does not emphasize
the purposive connotations of the word "search," while nearly all
of the courts which have attempted an explicit definition of the
term have relied upon these connotations. 140 This is not surpris-
ing, for as a practical matter most of the relevant intrusions into
private areas are "exploratory investigations,"'141 seeking to find
something, whether object or information, which may then be
appropriated for use by the government in the criminal process.
There are difficulties with limiting the definition of "search" to
such instances, however. The offensiveness of the intrusion, and
the extent to which privacy is violated, are not dependent upon
the intruder's state of mind. The values represented by ideal
privacy 142 are as much impaired by intrusions not directed at
obtaining evidence as by those which are, and it is widely admit-
ted that many governmental invasions of privacy are in fact un-
dertaken primarily for purposes other than gathering evidence.
14
The Supreme Court's recognition that the amendment implies a
federal cause of action for damages for its violation quite apart
from the remedy provided by the exclusionary rule 144 also in-
dicates that its application cannot be limited to those instances of
intrusion which are intuitively suggested by the word "search."
139 See, e.g., Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 [1942] ... had held that electronic
surveillance accomplished without the physical penetration of petitioner's
premises by a tangible object did not violate the Fourth Amendment .... Its
limitation on Fourth Amendment protection is, in the present day, bad
physics as well as bad law, for reasonable expectations of privacy may be
defeated by electronic as well as physical invasion.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 362 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
140 "[The word 'search' denotes an intention to find, and absent such an intention there
simply is no search." United States v. Lodahl, 264 F. Supp. 927, 928 (D. Mont. 1967)
(footnote omitted). "A search is a probing or exploration for something that is concealed or
hidden from the searcher .. " United States v. Haden, 397 F.2d 460, 465 (7th Cir. 1968).
141 "A search implies some exploratory investigation." United States v. Strickland, 62
F. Supp. 468, 471 (W.D.S.C. 1945).
142 See note 86 supra.
143 See generally J. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL (1966); P. CHEVIGNY, POLICE
POWER (1969); W. LAFAVE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY
(1965). This point is often cited by critics of the exclusionary rule, contending that
exclusion of evidence is not an effective deterrent to many forms of police misconduct
which are not directed toward securing evidence and thereby a conviction, but are
undertaken for other reasons (harrassment, enforcement of respect, etc.). See, e.g., Oaks,
Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665, 720-24
(1970) and sources cited therein.
144 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (197 1).
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b. Seizures-A seizure represents the appropriation of a pri-
vate affair or of an entire private area; it may be of a tangible or
an intangible possession. A possession whose physical manifesta-
tions are sufficiently significant to classify it as tangible will, if it is
private at all, constitute a distinct private area. An intangible
possession, however, cannot of itself be a private area; it must
depend upon its presence within a private area for its protection.
Thus there are two distinct classes of possessions subject to
seizure: those which are tangible and constitute a private area,
and those which are intangible and are located within a private
area. The criteria for determining whether an appropriation equals
a seizure are somewhat different in the two cases.
The seizure of a tangible possession may be accomplished by
any act which operates to diminish the amount of control which
the occupant would have exercised over the area in question
absent the government's action, and concomitantly to increase the
amount of control exercised by the government over that area. In
the most obvious cases, the transfer of dominion will be complete.
A seizure may also be effected when the government exercises
less than absolute control over the area, as, for example, by
denying the occupant access to his house or automobile, even if it
is not moved, its interior is not invaded, and no other seizures are
made within it. 1
4 5
An intangible possession, in order to qualify as a protected
private affair, must be "within" a private area. Not all appropria-
tions of private affairs are seizures, however. Just as the amend-
ment protects privacy only in places where it may be reasonably
expected, it protects against the interception of private in-
formation only in places and by means which would not be rea-
sonably expected. 146 It seems fairly certain that the positioning of
the receiver of information within a private area of the sender at
the time of interception is quite sufficient to render the appropria-
tion a seizure. The means employed in such cases are irrelevant.
1
4 See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), where the immobilization of a
car was considered to be no less a violation of privacy than a search of its interior.
Compare Justice Harlan's opinion, in which he also recognizes immobilization as a
seizure, but regards it as a "lesser" violation of privacy than a search of the interior. Id. at
62-65. On the possibility of impounding houses, see Note, Police Practices and the
Threatened Destruction of Tangible Evidence, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1465, 1474-89 (197 1).
146 See Comment, supra note 99, at 1263-65, where the author-lists the factors which
may affect reasonable expectations of privacy under two headings-characteristics of the
area and the nature of the police conduct. See also Note, supra note 14, at 982-97. For an
application of the reasonable expectations test to governmental conduct, see, e.g., People
v. Colvin, 19 Cal. App. 3d 14, 19-21, 96 Cal. Rptr. 397, 400-02 (1971) (considering
whether officer's aural and visual observation of bathroom from public driveway was
violation of reasonable expectations of privacy).
[VOL. 6:154
FALL 19721
When the receiver is outside a private area, however, the place
and manner of the observation are both important. 147 Often these
factors will tend to run together, as, for example, when a police-
man views a toilet stall through a ceiling vent 148 or climbs the side
of a house to look in an upper-story window. The place of in-
terception would be emphasized in situations such as looking into
a room from a fire escape, 149 while the use of "artificial" exten-
sions of the senses, such as electronic eavesdropping equipment,
would focus attention on the means employed. As a rule of
thumb, it may be said that the appropriation of private affairs will
escape constitutional prohibition only if "the defendant should
have reasonably anticipated that such observations could be made
by others in the normal pursuit of their daily activities."' 50 As
with private areas, the criteria for assessing reasonable ex-
pectations must be drawn from the norms and values of the
community.'
5'
B. Qualifications Upon the Exercise of
Privacy -Tests of Sufficiency
As noted earlier, 5 2 the right of privacy is the right to control
the access of others to a private area and its contents. The fourth
amendment does not, however, give rise to an unqualified right to
enforce absolute seclusion. In many cases several persons will
have concurrent rights of privacy within a single private area.
Each occupant's potential seclusion will be qualified by that of
every other. In most cases this fact would by itself be irrelevant to
the law of search and seizure because these co-occupants are
147 See, e.g., People v. Berutko, 71 Cal. 2d 84, 91-93, 453 P.2d 721, 724-26, 77 Cal.
Rptr. 217, 220-22 (1969), where the court weighed both factors and concluded that the
observation in that case was made from a place where the officer had a right to be and in a
proper manner.
' 48See State v. Bryant, 287 Minn. 205, 177 N.W.2d 800 (1970).
149 See Cohen v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. App. 3d 429, 85 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1970).
15
0 J. ISRAEL & W. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN A NUTSHELL: CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS 93 (1971) [hereinafter cited as NUTSHELL].
151 Note however that courts have approved, at least in certain circumstances, a variety
of surreptitious activities whose validity would be somewhat questionable if measured by
community folkways and mores, e.g., peering in windows (see cases cited in People v.
Alexander, 253 Cal. App. 2d 691, 61 Cal. Rptr. 814 (1967), but see Texas v. Gonzales,
388 F.2d 145 (5th Cir. 1968) ), secret observation of restrooms (see Smayda v. United
States, 352 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1965), but see Bielicki v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. 2d 602,
371 P.2d 288, 21 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1962)), eavesdropping at the door of an apartment (see
United States v. Llanes, 398 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1968), but see United States v. Case, 435
F.2d 766 (7th Cir. 1970) ), and rummaging through a person's trash (see United States v.
Dzialak, 441 F.2d 212 (2d Cir. 1971), but see People v. Edwards, 71 Cal.2d 1096, 458
P.2d 713, 80 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1969)). The trend since Katz, however, seems to be toward
giving such activities greater scrutiny. See NUTSHELL, supra note 150, at 93-94.
152 See note 72 and accompanying text supra.
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unlikely to be governmental agents, and their intrusion into the
area or appropriation of it or its contents would not be proscribed
under the fourth amendment. The relative rights that
co-occupants may have in an area become important, however, in
two situations: where one acts as a government agent, or where
one consents to a governmental search or seizure. This latter
case arises because an occupant of a private area always has the
option of exercising his control over access to that area per-
missively, that is, he may consent to intrusions and appropria-
tions, thereby waiving in part his right to seclusion.
A government agent may, therefore, legitimately acquire access
to a private area or its contents in two ways: (1) by qualifying as
an occupant of that area by virtue of his relationship to it,
without regard to the desires of other occupants, or (2) by the
consent of an occupant. Although the justification for any given
violation of a private area may involve several interrelated steps
under both categories, it is most convenient to analyze each
category separately.
1. The Rights of Co-occupants-a. Selective Admittance-All
rights of occupancy may be limited in extent (quantitatively) and
scope (qualitatively). The former limitations concern exactly who
may exercise them, and where and when they apply. The latter
specify the type of activities permitted and the purposes for which
or circumstances in which these activities may be undertaken.
The scope of an occupant's rights may range from the relative
completeness of fee simple ownership to those which accompany
very narrowly specified roles, such as maid, janitor, or repairman.
In the case of closely circumscribed rights of entry, the possessor
may do only what is reasonably expected to fall within the per-
formance of his particular role, 153 both as to the overt acts in-
volved 154 and the purposes for which they are permitted.' 55 Thus
a maid may not remove cigarettes from a hotel room which she
would not remove in the ordinary course of cleaning, and she
153 The law does not prohibit every entry, without a warrant, into a hotel room.
Circumstances might make exceptions and certainly implied or express per-
mission is given to such persons as maids, janitors, or repairmen in the
performance of their duties.
United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951).
154 See, e.g., United States v. Small, 297 F. Supp. 582 (D. Mass. 1969), where opening
the door of a coin locker and observing its contents were held to fall within an employee's
normal and reasonable duties, but changing its lock was not.
55 See, e.g., Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961), where, even though a
landlord apparently had authority to enter demised premises to "view waste," his entry
along with police for the purpose of searching for distilling equipmemt was outside the
scope of his authority and invalid.
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may not enter for the purpose of so doing.1 56 When a desk is given
over to an employee for his exclusive use, the employer may
retain a right to enter it in the course of business, as, for example,
when looking for "official property needed for official use."
1 57
Presumably this would not encompass a search for evidence unre-
lated to the business or an inspection prompted merely by idle
curiosity.
158
Reasonable expectations in this matter will be primarily
affected by the nature of (1) the area itself, (2) the occupant's
relation to the area, and (3) the relationship of multiple occupants
to each other. An area such as a hotel room is normally subjected
to intrusions by maids and others for various cleaning and mainte-
nance purposes. These must be reasonably expected by the lodg-
er.159 A landlord may retain an interest in rented premises which
would permit his entry for inspection purposes. 60 Again, this
particular class of intrusions is reasonably to be expected. Parents
are generally held to stand in a relationship to their minor children
which gives them special rights of access into the child's privacy
unit. 16' School officials may be held to act in loco parentis in
certain matters and thereby be entitled to certain rights of entry
based on that relationship.' 62 The existence of any of these fac-
tors may be evidenced by explicit statements, such as in in-
stitutional regulations, 63 though these are not necessarily con-
clusive.
164
b. Selective Dissemination- The standards for appropriation
of tangible possessions are highly uncertain, because nearly all
such questions arise in a context of explicit third-party consent
and because courts often tend to pay little attention to the validity
156 Purvis v. Wiseman, 298 F. Supp. 761 (D. Ore. 1969).
157United States v. Blok, 188 F.2d 1019, 1021 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
158 Her superiors could not reasonably search the desk for her purse, her
personal letters, or anything else that did not belong to the government and
had no connection with the work of the office.
Id.
59 See note 153 supra.16 0 See note 155 supra.
161 See, e.g., Maxwell v. Stephens, 229 F. Supp. 205 (E.D. Ark. 1964). But see People
v. Overall, 7 Mich. App. 153, 151 N.W.2d 225 (1967).
1
6 2 See People v. Overton, 20 N.Y.2d 360, 229 N.E.2d 596, 283 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1967),
remanded, 393 U.S. 85 (1968), reaff'd, 24 N.Y.2d 522, 249 N.E.2d 366, 301 N.Y.S.2d
479 (1969): State v. Stein, 203 Kan. 638, 456 P.2d 1 (1968). But see People v. Cohen, 57
Misc. 2d 366, 292 N.Y.S.2d 706 (Dist. Ct. 1968).
63 See, e.g., United States v. Donato, 269 F. Supp. 921 (E.D. Pa. 1967) (mint regu-
lation regarding inspection of lockers); United States v. Grisby, 335 F.2d 652 (4th Cir.
1964) (military regulation permitting commanding officer to authorize searches of quarters
of military personnel within reservation); Moore v. Student Affairs Comm., 284 F. Supp.
725 (M.D. Ala. 1968) (university regulation permitting inspection of student quarters).
164 See, e.g., Piazzola v. Watkins, 442 F.2d 284, 289 (5th Cir. 1971).
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of a seizure if it was not preceded by a search or was preceded by
a valid search. It would seem, however, that as concerns tangible
possessions, the standards for determining rights to disseminate
should be similar to those just discussed for determining rights of
admittance. Intangibles, on the other hand, are treated rather
differently. For while the dissemination of tangibles may be limit-
ed not only in extent but also in scope, possession of intangibles
(information) can be limited only by the circumstances of initial
accessibility. Once obtained it may be further disclosed without
fourth amendment restriction. 165 Whenever a co-occupant is en-
titled to enter and observe an area or is otherwise legitimately
privy to information, it may be further disseminated at the receiv-
er's discretion. The fourth amendment, then, does not limit the
scope of appropriations of intangibles.
2. Consent to Encroachments on Seclusion: The Permissive
Exercise of Privacy-Consent to what would otherwise be un-
constitutional searches and seizures is based conceptually on the
notion that privacy is a type of control, and the exercise of that
control may work to reduce as well as to maintain the actor's
seclusion. 166 In the law, these ideas find expression in the doc-
trines pertaining to the waiver of constitutional rights.
167
Consent to intrusions may be limited as to both the extent and
scope of the right of entry granted. These limitations can be equal
to or more restrictive than the grantor's rights but may not be
more expansive. Whenever the occupant's privacy interest is lim-
ited in space, time, circumstances, or purpose, any right of entry
conferred on another must fall within those limits. 168 Consent to
appropriations, on the other hand, cannot be so flexible in scope.
Once an occupant gives consent to an appropriation, either of a
tangible 169 or of an intangible, 70 the fourth amendment does not
limit the permissible scope of dissemination.
16See note 170 infra.
16 6 See notes 72 and 73 and accompanying text supra.
167 See NUTSHELL, supra note 150, at 155. On the doctrine of waiver, see generally
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); Tigar, Waiver of Constitutional Rights: Disquiet
in the Citadel, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1970).
168 Compare United States v. Brown, 300 F. Supp. 1285 (D.N.H. 1969) (consent by
owner of apartment to police search could not extend to friend's suitcases and attache case
left on premises), and United States v. Poole, 307 F. Supp. 1185, 1189 (E.D. La. 1969)
("If X leaves his closed suit case, in Y's apartment, this is no authorization to Y to open
the suitcase or for Y to allow others to open it."), with Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731
(1969) (cousin's consent to search of defendant's duffel bag on cousin's premises was
effective where he was a joint user of the bag).
16 9
See C. v. Brown, 437 Pa. 1, 261 A.2d 879 (1970) (policeman offered to help sell gun
but instead ran ballistics test on it); Graves v. Beto, 424 F.2d 524 (5th Cir. 1970) (blood
sample given police on representation it was to be tested for alcohol content but instead




The elusive contours of the fourth amendment right of privacy
reflect the confusion and contradiction which have marked its
existence. Certainly no "trick of logic" can weave its disparate
strands into a coherent whole. Yet it is not a perfectly integrated
body of law which is needed, but rather the conceptual tools for
making some sense out of the chaotic body of law which presently
exists. The purpose of this note has been to suggest a theoretic
perspective which might serve as a framework for the orderly
articulation and analysis of fourth amendment issues. Drawing
upon the idea of privacy in general, certain principles were de-
rived by which any question involving the privacy concept might
be approached. Consistency among legal rules and their appli-
cation may be a chimera, but consistency in their formulation and
interpretation is essential if they are ever to be commonly under-
stood.
-Steven C. Douse
Several cases have reached similar results on the mistaken assumption that valid
third-party consent to a search of the premises is sufficient to justify the seizure of other
persons' private possessions located therein. United States v. Vilhotti, 323 F. Supp. 425
(S.D.N.Y. 197 1); United States ex rel. Perry v. Russell, 315 F. Supp. 65 (W.D. Pa. 1970).
They seem to have considered the possessions to be protected only derivatively, by virtue
of their presence within another private area. Once admittance was legitimately gained
thereto, they seemed to find no need to consider separately the seizure of contents, or even
to recognize that the search and the seizure constituted two separate events.
170 Privacy, defined as "control over information about ourselves," would [as
commonly understood] include control over both the extent to [which] per-
sonal information will be acquired by others, and control over the extent to
which a known recipient of information will pass it on to a third person ....
[Yet] the Court has consistently refused to find any fourth amendment
protection against divulgence.
Comment, supra note 94, at 793-94. See, e.g., White v. United States, 401 U.S. 745
(1971).
